Articles that posted in Arts & Literature Exhibtion

Burma needs Strategy not Strategery

Is Power Mediation a solution?

By Bo Kyaw Nyein

July 23, 2007 - When news broke of an American diplomat meeting three ministers representing the Burmese junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), in Beijing, some were surprised, some were critical and some met the revelation with suspicion. This author and his colleagues wrote a paper in January 2006 (http://www.mizzima.com/MizzimaNews/MizzimaForum/01-July-2007.html) suggesting American policy makers take a different route, because the route taken by Americans of shouting rhetoric and isolating the Burmese junta just falls into the hands of the military dictators and leads nowhere.

There are two opposing camps or two schools of thought when it comes to dealing with the military junta in Burma. Neither works. One side wants to take a radical stand and oppose blindly anything that concerns the Burmese military dictators. Their view is to declare the junta as evil, and shout rhetoric as loudly as possible, push for more sanctions, isolate the Burmese regime and no, they don't want to hear talk of any dealings or dialogue with the current power holders in Burma. The seeming patron of this group is the powerful Senator from Kentucky who genuinely respects Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the iconic leader who is still suffering in detention and yet still fighting for freedom, liberal democracy, and basic human rights for her people. Her bravery, dedication and conviction should be recognized.

The other side is led by academics, intellectuals and others who feel that the current stalemate and isolation of the SPDC does not serve the interests of the American or Burmese people, and they believe dialogue with the Burmese regime is necessary. They prefer the "Constructive Engagement" policy practiced by ASEAN nations. Thinking that the 2004 U.S. Presidential election might bring regime change in America, leading thinkers of this group wrote and published papers in 2004, hoping an incoming Democratic President might lend a sympathetic ear to their calls for engaging the Burmese military regime. Unfortunately for this camp President Bush was reelected.

After the 2004 election, the isolationists secured the upper hand, and the Burmese junta has been heralded an outpost of tyranny along with North Korea, as defined by U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice. As a strong opponent against military dictatorship in Burma and a true believer in liberal democracy, it was music to the ears of this author and his colleagues when the U.S. President and Secretary of State denounced the Burmese military dictators in the strongest terms. It is also a morale boost for the Burmese opposition camp to know that the U.S. President and his administration are standing tall with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in her darkest hours. In this respect, President Bush must be saluted for never wavering in his strong support for the Burmese national leader and Democratic icon, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

But on the other hand, without sounding ungrateful to President Bush, as professionals and as intellectuals, one should also think beyond the rhetoric and ask what is the strategy of American foreign policy, if there is one for Burma, and where is it leading to? To date, as far as one can tell, there is no clearly defined well thought-out American foreign policy for Burma per se and American actions are leading nowhere.

Because of beltway politics, and as the esteemed Senator from Kentucky was one of the most powerful Republican Senators among the Republican leadership during the Republicans majority rule and who also happened to be the senior member of the all-powerful Senate Appropriations Committee and who chaired the Appropriations Sub-committee for Foreign Operations, it seems Bush Administration and State Department officials basically relegated control of Burma policy to the wishes of the powerful Senator.
Behind the Senator, giving advice and formulating American actions is an unofficial group of bi-partisan congressional staff, lobbyists, and NGOs, which is known as the "Burma Group". In typical American culture, this group thinks and acts with some arrogance, thinking they know best for Burma while unconsciously wanting to demonstrate their power.

Burmese people and Burmans in particular are very nationalistic, and because of their long history with colonialism they resent any form of dictation or domination by foreigners. In general, rightly or wrongly, Burmese generals in Pyinmana, Dr Zarni, this author and many of his colleagues, including the current National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB) General Secretary, and many in the Opposition carry this nationalistic pride.

As a result, this group ends up working mostly with an activist group based in Washington D.C. which does take orders, since their workhorse is an American, fronting a Burmese. Sometimes they lean on a representative of the exile government, which in reality is no more than a 5 member Burmese NGO which has been struggling to survive on political handouts for the past 18 years.
So in the final analysis, "Burma Group" actions are more oriented towards an activists' mentality on an ad hoc basis, rather than deliberate thinking for formulating long term policy with the final goal of long-term political solutions for Burma. There are some in the group who are far-sighted, level-headed and mature professionals, but the radicals seem to dominate the final decisions.

Let's examine what the SPDC generals have been doing for the past 18 years while American and the Burmese activists have been shouting rhetoric. At the start, the generals were unsure of themselves and they were short of foreign reserve in hard currency. At that time, it was a wise move to launch economic sanctions and to demand to meet with the National League for Democracy (NLD), which was not only elected by the people but the biggest and most organized opposition in Burma, led by a true iconic leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

Though most of the ruling generals may lack intellectual thinking along Western norms, they are battle-tested and street smart fighters. While the two senior generals concentrated on building the armed forces, their key power-base, they relegated foreign affairs, the suppression of internal dissidents and exile opposition to the most cunning of the three ruling generals, General Khin Nyunt, the chief of military intelligence. Following their mentor Ne Win's playbook, the generals detained key opposition players and slowly harassed and destroyed the supporters of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. They slowly and methodically closed the political space for opposition politicians while stretching out the time. Time, it should be noted, is a tool in and of itself as it destroys the morale and hope of the opposition. They are effectively playing TIME & SPACE.

Opposition leaders, both domestic and in exile, fell for their own rhetoric and failed to recognize the strategy being implemented by the military. Building political infrastructure using underground networks is necessary to build and maintain public support as an important political tool to counter ruthless suppression and, if necessary, to prepare for a national uprising.

The National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), the government in exile, has no clue what is needed to help unite the Burmese in exile and to bring them as a united and effective force to help support and/or to build a formidable opposition and political infrastructure inside Burma in support of the struggling leadership. Instead, they are busy writing papers, attending conferences, and traveling the world asking for more donations while jealously guarding access to major donors from other groups.

NLD leaders inside the country who were spared arrest also failed to formulate a winning strategy or to change the strategy to meet the challenges imposed by the ruthless ruling generals. The biggest mistake was that these NLD elders failed to delegate responsibilities to more able, younger leaders to find a political solution. The only rhetoric the exiled members and NLD leaders inside consistently know how to shout is: "Free Daw Aung San Suu Kyi". Instead of building a base, they live on slogans, statements and rhetoric. So it is not a surprise that the movement has been reduced to a "Singularity". It makes life so much easier for the ruling generals to implement their strategy, utilizing the principles of time and space. Remove the "Singularity" and the opposition exists only in name.

While successive American administration policy makers failed to formulate a sound and well defined Burma foreign policy and while NCGUB and NLD elders were shouting "Free Daw Aung San Suu Kyi", General Khin Nyunt formed an Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) and started wooing the Indians while cementing the relationship with China and selling the "Constructive Engagement" policy to ASEAN. In other words they were successfully implementing their form of triangulation theory. To buy time they agreed for talks but set a never ending time table for building confidence and understanding. They then initiated the "Roadmap," upon which they are dragging their feet on their first step: the National Convention. During this long stretch of time they have discovered natural gas resources, allowing them to spend even more on military hardware.

While American policies on Burma were based on emotion and rhetoric, the Chinese set their policies on Burma slowly and deliberately, based on national interest. Their policy makers are experts on Burma and they speak fluent Burmese. Most importantly they know the culture and mindset of the Burmese. They study the players carefully and they know the sensitive nature of Burmese nationalism and make an effort not to invoke any arrogance in dealing either with the government or the opposition. The Chinese are using the intellectual power of think tanks more than ever before, but their think tanks are not independent institutions like in the West, but rather resemble the Burmese OSS, as they are established to advise and serve the government and party.

Nevertheless, Chinese officials are smooth, knowledgeable and impressive. Make no mistake; Chinese policy is to support the present regime in power, at the same time as not antagonizing the opposition. The Chinese have met with many opposition players and have built a working relationship with a certain younger generation NLD leader in exile in particular, who have a temperament to develop good diplomatic skills, is articulate, understand Western thinking and policy making, and once was a trusted and close aides of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi during the critical years of early 1990s. He enjoys the full confidence of newly elected NLD-LA and NCUB leadership and he works well with other individuals who have intellectual capacity and who can contribute.

Chinese officials regularly visit Burma and understand the pulse of the ruling generals. Their main goal is to look after China's interest and to prevent China from being a guilty party if there is another uprising and the military is toppled. After a recent visit to Kunming and Shweli, this author came to the conclusion that the Chinese are methodical in their thinking and thorough in their implementation.

Furthermore, the Chinese are not interested in gas and border trading only, they have a

desire to convert Rakhine (Yakine) state to an oil depositary like Texas & Louisiana in America, where they will transport oil from the Middle East to Rakhine and pipe it to Bhamo and then to Yunnan, bypassing the entire trip through the Straits of Malacca to the East China Sea. As most oil business people know, there are certain equity investors who can say no to American sanctions. Negotiations are progressing well and if this plan can be realized and if they can expand upon it to include downstream activities for oil and gas, the building of refineries and other derivatives, Burma can and will become a vital part of China's energy security plan.

Knowing the importance of their gas and geographical location, the Burmese are now

trying to play the Russian card, trying to balance the Chinese with the Russians, and in the process buying another UN veto, just in case the Chinese get cozy with the Americans in the UN. The Burmese generals would rather export all the gas they can find and use atomic energy for local consumption, along the way trying to enrich uranium for military use. They have North Korea and Iran to turn to for assistance, and even the bad boy from Latin America, who declared George Bush “evil” in the U.N., will lend them a hand in opposing Uncle Sam.

So is there an alternate route if isolation and sanctions do not work on one hand and "Constructive Engagement" is just a dud? There is definitely a third solution. In this respect, this author and his colleagues think America has an important role to play in Burma policy but must share leadership with the Chinese. Like it or not, it is the reality that the Chinese have the upper hand when it comes to Burma. At this very moment they are the true giant and only they have the necessary influence to convince the ruling generals to find a real long-lasting solution for Burma.

Just like in North Korea talks, the U.S. and China should take the lead but bring in all major global powers such as the EU, Japan, India, ASEAN, Russia and Canada to have their say and to speak in one voice. With a collective and united stand these global powers can conduct power mediation, giving the ssurances needed for the SPDC generals not to be tried at the International Criminal Court, along with giving them incentives to rejoin the family of nations; but they must find a true and durable solution which will include Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the participation of ethnic leaders. If China sides with other global powers, it will be very difficult for the SPDC generals to take a hard, radical stance. However, Russia may be the wild card, since Russia's relationship with the West is fast deteriorating.

Instead of China playing the role of a broker, between the U.S. and SPDC, the U.S and China must discuss and find common ground on how to deal with the SPDC generals and act as honest brokers in a discussion between Burmese stake holders. But there is a trap; why are Burmese generals eager to meet with the U.S.? If they can neutralize the United States, and if they can still resist international pressure to negotiate with the main opposition leaders at the same time, they will have to a degree marginalized Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, since the U.S. is her key supporter. This danger must be understood.

In the meantime the U.S. should revisit its views on the Burmese opposition both in exile and inside the country and carefully study the players just as the Chinese have. The 88 Generation leaders such as Min Ko Naing and Ko Ko Kyi are becoming important and critical players inside Burma. Building political infrastructure and seeking other capable, new and younger generation leaders is needed, since the generation after 1988 has to date been totally ignored and discarded.

Relying mostly on activists in the Washington D.C. metropolitan area is short-sighted and the NCGUB is a total failure. The U.S. should know better. I would hope they learned their lessons in Iraq from Chalabi and Maliki. If the U.S. is serious and genuine in its desire to help the Burmese people, the U.S. should look seriously into finding a

durable solution for Burma.

Otherwise, the U.S. will continue cultivating the political welfare culture where many of the so-called exile governments (yes, there are more than one) and activist groups will beg for money in the name of the Burmese people and democracy, while others will keep writing a Burma Constitution in parallel to the never ending National Convention. This will continue until most players, if not all, pass away from the stage. History will then record this Burma episode as another Bush Strategery rather than Bush Strategy.
It must also be clearly understood that the ultimate responsibility to bring democracy back to Burma lies with the Burmese people; it must not rely solely on global powers.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is no doubt an iconic national leader loved and admired by the majority of the people. She is the hope for many. Yet she is just an agent of change. The solution has to be found in a transition that both the military and the democratic leaders can accept, in short of an all out peoples uprising as in the many "colored" revolutions of the early 21st and late 20th centuries. If all the peaceful attempts fail then Burma may not have any other choice but to join the list of color revolutions. That may ultimately be the final destiny.

Burma does not stand a chance to regain democracy by just shouting "Free Aung San Suu Kyi."

If the Burmese truly love their golden land and their leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, they must learn to rise above petty personal conflicts, work hard and find a common thread or platform to introduce unity and strength from which the much required political infrastructure can be built. Without strength, the SPDC generals will never pay attention to the cries or demands of the opposition.

Only the Burmese can save their leader, who has sacrificed enough for the country and the people. Otherwise, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi will follow another iconic leader, the Dalai Lama, who is a beloved leader of Tibetan Buddhists and an international figure for world peace. But he is still unable to find a solution for Tibet.

The Tibet story will disappear into the sunset and will be forgotten when the Dalai Lama leaves the stage. Similarly, Burma will also become a forgotten country when Daw Aung San Suu Kyi disappears from the stage, by natural means or otherwise (remember Dapayin?). Time is definitely not on our side.

The Burmese too have a choice like George W Bush: Strategy or Strategery?

Bo Kyaw Nyein

bnyein@gmail.com

Bo Kyaw Nyein is the youngest son of U Kyaw Nyein, former Deputy Prime Minister during U Nu's (AFPFL) regime and a close colleague of General Aung San during the Independence struggle. Bo Kyaw Nyein was sentenced to 7 years for his role in the leadership during U Thant's crisis in 1974 and spent nearly 5 years in infamous Insein jail. He is an engineer by profession. He writes political articles for Mizzima and others.

For non-American readers, a note on the meaning of Strategery by Wikipedia: The word "Strategery" gained popularity when it was used in a comedy sketch aired October 7, 2000 , satirizing the erformances of Al Gore and George W. Bush, two candidates for President of the United States, during the first residential debate for election year 2000. Comedian Will Ferrell (SNL) played Bush and used the word "strategery," a mock-Bushism playing on the words "strategy" and "strategic".

.